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Children's Learning from Contrast Modelling 
 
 
Abstract
 
This study investigates the effectiveness of immediately modelling the correct solution to 
a task on which children were making errors. The technique is based on proposals by 
Saxton (1997) who, in his Contrast theory of negative input, claims that corrective speech 
input is particularly effective when it immediately follows a child’s error, such as an 
overgeneralisation of a verb ending. Our study concerns a very different domain, that of 
children learning to balance beams on a fulcrum, but one in which children also tend to 
overgeneralise a particular strategy. On a pre-test on the balance beam task, we identified 
a number of children (N = 79, mean age = 74.82 months) who were making errors. These 
children were randomly assigned to two groups and either (a) watched the correct 
solution being modelled by an adult or (b) saw the correct solution being modelled by an 
adult immediately after their own error. The latter, Contrast Modelling, condition 
produced a significantly higher number of children who had improved at the task at post-
test. The implications of these findings for general models of development are discussed.   
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Introduction 
 
It is generally assumed that the use of both feedback and correct exemplars will assist 
children’s learning. These assumptions underlie much classroom activity which is 
mediated both by teachers and by computers. Research into the effectiveness of feedback 
has generally indicated that it can assist children’s progress (e.g. Tait, Hartley & 
Anderson, 1973; Schimmel, 1983), although in certain circumstances feedback may be 
ineffective (Cromer, 1987; Messer, Norgate, Joiner, Littleton & Light, 1996; Messer, 
Mohamedali & Fletcher, 1996).  The benefits of correct exemplars and modelling have 
been highlighted by the work of Bandura (1973) and have been the subject of intense 
research for nearly three decades.   
 
It is apparent that feedback and modelling can be organised in a variety of ways.  In this 
study we investigate the benefits of providing children with the correct model after they 
have made an error.  Our interest in this issue arose from work by Saxton (1997) which 
suggests that children’s language acquisition can be assisted by the provision of a correct 
utterance immediately after children have made a grammatical error. The effect of this 
type of response often has been overlooked in studies of children’s speech because of the 
emphasis given to the many model utterances that are present in the language 
environment of children. Saxton found that organising the presentation of information in 
this way was more effective than providing a similar number of non-contingent examples 
of model utterances. Saxton proposes what he refers to as Contrast theory to account for 
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these effects and stresses that the potency of this process is due to the immediate 
contingency of the correct adult utterance upon the child’s error.   
 
Saxton situates his research in relation to current discussions about language acquisition 
and a longstanding argument about the significance of negative input and feedback. The 
findings of Brown and Hanlon (1970) indicated that parents do not explicitly correct their 
children’s grammatical errors. However, subsequent investigations revealed that adults 
often follow a child’s error with a grammatically correct expansion of the utterance (e.g. 
Hirsh-Pasek, Treiman & Schneiderman, 1984; Demetras, Post & Snow, 1986; Bohannon 
& Stanowicz, 1988). The ensuing debate about these findings concerned whether 
expansions assist language acquisition by providing children with indirect feedback about 
which of their utterances are correct and which are incorrect (Pinker, 1988; Jackendoff, 
1993). Saxton argues that such discussions have ignored the potential benefits of children 
being immediately provided with a correct model utterance. He believes that expansions 
provide more than indirect feedback about whether or not an utterance is grammatically 
correct. He claims that the contrast between a child’s error and the parent’s model 
utterance provides a much more powerful learning experience, and he has experimental 
evidence to support his claim. 
 
The research conducted by Saxton was concerned with children making 
overgeneralisation errors; that is they apply a grammatical rule to an inappropriate word. 
Well-known examples of this phenomenon are children saying “sheeps” or “goed” 
(Saxton, 1997, p.155). Children’s overgeneralisation errors are similar in form to one of 
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the levels of cognitive development identified in our previous research.  This research has 
developed out of Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) model of Representational Redescription, and 
she discusses the way that overgeneralisation errors correspond to one of the levels of 
knowledge she identifies. Our own research, using a balancing task, has confirmed 
Karmiloff-Smith’s predictions that children show evidence of “overgeneralisation” by 
inappropriately applying a “rule” to certain problems. The work also indicates that these 
children are less likely than children at other representational levels to benefit from 
interventions designed to assist their learning. This makes it especially interesting to 
determine whether contingent modelling can be utilised by children who show evidence 
of overgeneralisation, but who are involved in a very different task.    
  
The task chosen to test this hypothesis in our investigation is a balance beam task (see 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder, 1974) in which a child has to balance some wooden beams 
upon a simple fulcrum. The beams basically fall into two categories, symmetrical and 
asymmetrical. The symmetrical ones are either a flat piece of wood, or one with a small 
block attached to each end. The asymmetrical ones have one or two blocks, only at one 
end. When placed upon a fulcrum the symmetrical beams balance at their geometric 
centre whereas the asymmetrical beams have to be positioned off-centre. In our previous 
studies we have replicated Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder’s finding that many children are 
only able to balance symmetrical beams. This is because they place every beam, 
whatever its type, onto the fulcrum at its geometric centre. Yet when the asymmetrical 
beams fall these children replace them at the centre, often many times, before dismissing 
them as being impossible to balance. This somewhat surprising finding is remarkably 
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robust. For example, in a cross sectional study of 168 children aged 4 to 9 years, we 
found 80 children who could not balance asymmetrical beams (Pine and Messer, 1999). 
These children seem to operate according to the maxim that ‘all things must balance in 
the middle’ and ignore the proprioceptive feedback from their own hands which 
intuitively one would expect to guide them to balance the beams off-centre.  
 
Although these language and cognitive domains present very different problems to 
children, involving learning irregular past tense verbs or balancing asymmetrical beams, 
in both cases children are seen to overgeneralise a rule. In Saxton’s study of language, 
children were overgeneralising the -ed ending of the past tense to irregular verbs (e.g. I 
feeled it instead of I felt it, 1997, p. 315). In the balancing studies, the children were 
overgeneralising a strategy for symmetrical beams to asymmetrical beams. Because of 
these commonalities, we thought it would be of considerable interest to ascertain whether 
these processes reflect general cognitive principles underlying the linguistic and cognitive 
domains. However, it is worth noting that the information provided by Contrast 
modelling could form the basis of slightly different learning processes in these examples 
of language and balancing. It is possible that language development involves learning 
irregular past-tense verbs on a case-by-case basis, as has been proposed in the dual 
mechanism model (Pinker, 1991), and here children would have to learn exceptions to a 
rule. This claim is disputed by connectionist theorists who argue that irregular and regular 
verbs are acquired by the same associative cognitive mechanism (e.g. Plunkett, 1995). On 
the other hand, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has suggested that the development of higher 
levels of representation does not necessarily involve the elimination of earlier 
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representations, and these earlier representations may continue to be applied in some 
circumstances to problems (Murphy, Pine & Schelletter, 2002). Thus, children might 
continue to apply their ‘centre’ strategy to symmetrical beams, but formulate a new rule 
to cope with exceptions. It should be apparent that these approaches to acquisition 
identify different mechanisms, and there is uncertainty about the precise learning 
mechanisms in both language and other domains. However, all these proposals are 
compatible with a learning process that involves contrast modelling. 
  
Karmiloff-Smith (1992), in her Representational Redescription model, offers a plausible 
explanation for why these overgeneralisations occur in many domains of learning. In her 
model, knowledge which is acquired about the physical world is initially encoded in an 
implicit format. This means that children can interact with, and often gain mastery over, 
their spatial environment without having any knowledge of the physical laws which 
govern their world. Thus, a child as young as 4 or 5 years may be able to balance both 
symmetrical and asymmetrical beams on a fulcrum, but shows little evidence of higher 
order abstraction of principles and cannot explain their own success. However, 
Karmiloff-Smith believes that the cognitive system does not simply guide action but is 
driven to gain control and understanding of the actions. Therefore an abstract system is 
built, founded upon the implicit knowledge. In order to achieve this, following a period 
of success, the implicit representation undergoes redescription to the next level in the RR 
model called Level E1. This involves abstracting the central feature from the wide range 
of experiences the child has had within the domain and forming a coherent rule or 
‘theory’.  Such ‘theories’ constitute a more abstract type of knowledge and in the case of 
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the balancing domain involves the assumption that ‘all things balance in the centre’. This 
generalisation means that accuracy suffers, errors are made and evidence which 
disconfirms the theory is ignored. The advantage is that the child now has a useful 
heuristic and can build further abstract - or metacognitive - knowledge.  A number of 
other investigators have commented on cognitive development in relation to implicit and 
explicit examples of children’s knowledge (Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Clements 
& Perner, 1994; Kuhn, Amsel & O’Loughlin, 1988 ). 
   
Karmiloff-Smith supposes that when acquiring language, children gradually recognise 
patterns in their linguistic environment and construct ‘theories-in-language’ as revealed 
by overgeneralisation errors such as foots instead of feet, or goed instead of went  
(Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974). Karmiloff-Smith suggests that this phenomenon in 
language demonstrates that children are building a meta-linguistic system and that 
providing frequent counter-examples will not induce them to drop their theory. She 
points out that children continue for some time to produce these overgeneralisations until 
they are ready spontaneously to recognise that exceptions to the rule exist.   
 
The top-down nature of the knowledge involving overgeneralisations raises concerns 
about how children can be helped to move beyond this stage. Karmiloff-Smith argues that 
the process is largely endogenous and that redescription to more explicit formats usually 
will be internally provoked. Consistent with this view are findings that children at this 
level of knowledge do not benefit from observational learning, where the model is not 
contingent on the child’s error  (Pine and Messer, 2000), and that children do not benefit 
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from computer-based feedback (Messer et al., 1996). However, this viewpoint may need 
to re-evaluated because there is evidence that peer interaction can assist representational 
redescription at some levels (Messer et al., 1993) and that asking children to produce 
explanations of another’s correct performance aids progress (Pine & Messer, 2000). It 
should also be apparent that Saxton’s theory claims children becomes aware of 
exceptions to the rule via the immediate juxtaposition of incorrect and correct speech 
forms, whereas the RR model supposes that at certain phases children will have difficulty 
making use of external information 
 
Drawing on Karmiloff-Smith's, Saxton’s and our own work, we pose a question about 
whether Contrast Modelling is an effective intervention technique, particularly in relation 
to children who “overgeneralise”. In this study, children who are making errors on a 
balance beam task are provided with models of the correct solution in an intervention that 
follows the pre-test. Children are randomly allocated to one of two conditions.  In one 
condition the modelling immediately follows the child’s error, this is referred to as the 
Contrast modelling condition (analogous to Saxton’s Contrast theory of corrective input). 
In the second, Non-Contingent modeling, condition the child sees an adult model the 
correct solution but this does not immediately follow the child’s own error. If it is the 
contingency of the correction upon the child’s error that is the potent variable, as Saxton 
claims to be the case in language learning, we expect the Contrast condition to produce 
greater improvement. Such a finding would suggest that there could be a general learning 
mechanism underlying similar forms of both linguistic and other cognitive behaviour. 
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Method 
 
 A pre-test, treatment phase and post-test design was employed. The treatment phase had 
two between subjects conditions: Contrast modelling and Non-Contingent modelling. The 
dependent variables were (i) the within subjects pre- to post-test change in number of 
asymmetrical beams balanced (ii) the within subjects pre- to post-test change in 
representational level. 
 
Participants.
One hundred and twenty six children from four Hertfordshire lower schools took part in 
the pre-test. The children were all in Year 1 or Year 2 and ranged in age from 5 to 7 
years. Forty-seven of the children were able to balance all the beams at pre-test and did 
not take part in the rest of the study. Seventy-nine children, mean age 74.82 months, took 
part in the treatment phase and post-test phase of the experiment. These included 42 boys 
and 37 girls. 
 
Materials.
For the pre- and post-test eight wooden beams were used: 
4 symmetrical beams, two without blocks (30 cm. long), one with a block either end (30 
cm. long) and one ‘double’ beam (45 cm. long). All of these balanced at their geometric 
centre.  
4 asymmetrical beams, one with one block at one end, three with two blocks at each end, 
30 cms in length. All of these balanced off-centre.  For examples of the beams used see 
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Figure 1. The fulcrum was constructed by having a plastic block, 1cm square x 30cms 
long glued along the centre of a wooden base, 20cms wide x 30cms long. The sessions 
were recorded using a Panasonic VHS video camera. 
 
Insert Fig 1 about here 
 
Procedure.
The children were seen individually in a quiet area of the school. The child was seated at 
a table alongside the experimenter and, after introductions, the experimenter explained 
that they were to do some balancing. Each child was shown the materials and told, “I 
would like you to see if you can make any of these wooden beams balance on the bar 
here (indicates fulcrum).” After checking that the child understood what was required, 
answering any questions asked and ensuring that she or he wished to continue, the 
experimenter invited the child to choose a beam with which to begin. 
Pre-test: The child attempted the beams one at a time and the experimenter encouraged 
the child to give explanations about how each beam balanced or, if it would not, the 
reason why he or she thought it would not. This was done by asking the children after 
they were successful, “How did you get that one to balance?” or “How is that one 
balancing?”  Similarly, if a child failed to balance a beam the experimenter asked 
questions like, “Why won’t it balance?”, “What did you do to try and get it to balance?” 
or “Do you think it can be balanced?” Any children who successfully balanced all the 
beams were praised, thanked and returned to their classroom. 
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Treatment Phase: After the pre-test the children who had not balanced all the beams were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Thirty-eight children went on to experience 
the Contrast modelling condition, 41 went on to the Non-Contingent modelling condition. 
Contrast modelling condition: In this condition the experimenter selected the beams that 
the child had failed to balance at pre-test and told the child, “ I would like you to have 
another try at balancing these beams”. The child attempted the beams one at a time and, 
as soon as he or she failed to balance one, the experimenter said, “Shall I have a try at 
that one?” and balanced the beam on the fulcrum. This was repeated for each of the 
beams that the child failed to balance, each time the child’s unsuccessful attempt was 
immediately followed by the experimenter modelling how the beam balanced. 
Non-Contingent modelling condition: In this condition the experimenter selected the 
beams that the child had failed to balance at pre-test and asked the child to have another 
attempt. Then the experimenter said to the child, “ I have had a bit more practice than you 
at balancing. Would you like to see how I make these beams balance?” The experimenter 
then balanced each of the beams in turn upon the fulcrum. 
Post-test: The child was then told, “Now I would like you to have another go at balancing 
all the beams” and the post-test was conducted in the same way as the pre-test, with the 
child attempting all 8 beams and the experimenter asking questions to probe their 
knowledge. 
 
There was then a short debriefing session when the experimenter answered any questions 
the children had, praised and thanked them. The child’s performance during the session 
was recorded on a data sheet by the experimenter and by the video recording. As well as 
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recording the number of beams balanced by each child, a classification system was used 
to code each child at pre- and post-test according to a level of representation. This 
ensured that not only behavioural measures were obtained but also a measure of the 
explicitness of the children’s knowledge about balancing, based on the type of 
explanations they were able to offer. Our previous work (see Pine and Messer, 1998, 
1999) has identified a developmental sequence of levels which accounts for children’s 
representations of the balance task and these were used to classify the children in this 
study: 
 
Implicit: the child is able to balance at least three of each type of beam (out of 4 
symmetrical and 4 asymmetrical beams), but has no consistent strategy for balancing or 
for initially placing a beam on the fulcrum. In addition the child is unable to offer an 
explanation for their success (e.g., says “Don’t know” or “I just did it”), or explanations 
fail to include a mention of both the relevant variables, weight and distance.  
Implicit Transition: the child is able to balance no more than one of each type of beam, 
but places all beams onto the fulcrum at around their mid-point. Explanations are similar 
to those at the Implicit level (see above). 
Abstraction Non-Verbal: the child is able to balance at least three symmetrical beams but 
fails on all, or all but one, of the asymmetrical beams. There is clear evidence of a centre 
strategy, with all beams being placed onto the fulcrum at their mid-point. The child may 
state that asymmetrical beams cannot be balanced but does not explain their centre 
theory. 
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Abstraction Verbal: performance is equivalent to Abstraction Non-Verbal level (see 
above) but explanations include reference to the centre strategy (e.g., says, “You have to 
put it in the middle.”). 
Explicit Transition: the child is able to balance at least three of each type of beam and is 
able to explain their strategy for balancing both types (e.g., says, “You have to put this in 
the middle,” for a symmetrical beam, or, “You have to put this one a bit more over to the 
side,” for an asymmetrical beam). However, there is no explanation of the function of the 
two relevant variables, weight and distance.  
Explicit E3: the child is able to balance at least two, and usually all, of each type of beam 
and explanations include reference to the compensatory function of the two variables, 
weight and distance (e.g., says, “This side’s got more weight on so I make this side 
longer so that it has the same weight”). 
A small number of children could not balance any beams at pre-test, showed no use of 
any strategy and could not explain the task; they were classified as Pre-Implicit. 
 
Children were classified according to the criteria outlined above.  For the present study 
inter-rater reliability was assessed by having two raters independently classify 12 of the 
children’s videotaped performances at pre-test. This produced 83% inter-rater agreement. 
Discrepancies were resolved by discussion and thereafter one experimenter classified the 
children.  
 
Results 
 
The number of children classified at each representational level. 
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The 47 children who balanced all of the beams at the pre-test are not included in any of 
the analyses. Those who failed to balance at least one beam took part in the rest of the 
study (N = 79).  The number of children at each level of representation at pre-test is 
shown in Table 1. 
     
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
The effect of the conditions on ability to balance symmetrical and asymmetrical beams.  
For the majority of children the symmetrical beams were far easier to balance than the 
asymmetrical beams. At pre-test the mean number of symmetrical beams balanced, out of 
a maximum of 4, was 2.89 (sd = 1.19), this improved to 3.63 (sd = .83) at post-test. The 
mean number of asymmetrical beams balanced at pre-test, again out of a maximum of 4, 
was just 1.24 (sd = 1.18), rising at post test to 2.79 (sd = 1.49).  As there was more scope 
for pre- to post-test improvement in the ability to balance asymmetrical beams (and it is 
with these beams that errors arise from overgeneralisation) the following analyses 
concerns these beams.   
 
The mean number of asymmetrical beams balanced at pre-test by children who were 
subsequently randomly allocated to the Contrast modelling group was 1.05 (sd = 1.04).  
The mean number balanced by children who were subsequently randomly allocated to the 
Non-Contingent modelling group was 1.43 (sd = 1.32). To test that the two groups did 
not differ significantly at pre-test these scores were entered into a one factor Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with Condition (2 levels, Contrast modelling and Non-Contingent 
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modelling) as the between subjects factor. No significant difference was found, F (1,77) 
= 2.94 p > .05. 
 
The number of asymmetrical beams balanced at pre-test and at post-test were entered into 
a mixed ANOVA with Condition as the between subjects factor (2 levels, Contrast 
modelling and Non-Contingent modelling) and the pre- and post-test scores as the 
repeated measures dependent variable. There was a main effect of number of beams 
balanced pre- to post- test, F (1, 77) = 83.04, p < .01. Therefore, overall the children were 
able to balance significantly more asymmetrical beams at post-test than at pre-test. There 
was also an interaction of the number of beams with condition, F (1,77) = 5.57, p  < .05. 
The Contrast modelling condition produced a significantly greater improvement in the 
number of asymmetrical beams balanced pre- to post-test than the Non-Contingent 
modelling condition (see Figure 2). 
  
    Insert Figure 2 about here 
     
The effect of the conditions on representational level. 
As well as performance measures we were also interested in whether the children’s 
representation of balancing had been changed. By classifying the children according to 
one of the levels of representation at pre-test it was possible to record whether or not a 
child had reached a higher level of representation in the post-test. As Table 1 shows, of 
the 38 children in the Contrast modelling condition, 23 (61%) moved to a higher level at 
post-test. In the Non-Contingent modelling condition, only 9 children out of 40 (23%) 
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improved. A chi-square analysis of these frequencies revealed a highly significant 
association between condition experienced and improvement, X2 (1, N = 78) = 11.65 p < 
.01. 
 
Contrast Modelling and Children’s Level of Representation 
It was thought worthwhile to examine the effect of the conditions on children at different 
levels of representation. However, the limited number of children at some levels means 
that one must be cautious when interpreting these data.   
Implicit Levels: There were only 9 children at the Implicit level, and none of these 
increased their performance from pre-test to post-test.  Of the 14 children at the Implicit 
Transition level, in the Contrast Modelling condition 4 out of 6 improved, and in the 
Non-Contingent modelling condition 3 out of 8 improved. Due to the small numbers in 
these groups it was not possible to test these associations statistically. 
Abstraction Levels: Did contrast modelling assist the progress of children who were 
using a centre strategy with asymmetrical beams and failing to balance them? These 
children were classified as being either at the Abstraction Non-Verbal or the Abstraction 
Verbal levels.  
The Abstraction Non-Verbal group (n = 21) included children who tried to balance beams 
at their geometric centre but could not verbalise their centre strategy. Of the 10 children 
at this level in the Contrast modelling condition, 7 improved (70%) whereas of the 11 
children at this level in the Non-Contingent modelling condition, only 3 improved (37%). 
A Chi-square analysis revealed that the association between condition and improvement 
just reached significance, X2  (1, N = 21) = 3.83, p = .05. Thus for children at the 
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Abstraction Non-Verbal level, improvement was more likely if they had been in the 
Contrast modelling condition. 
 
The Abstraction Verbal group  (n = 20) included children who tried to balance beams at 
their geometric centre but these children, unlike those at the Abstraction Non-Verbal 
level, could also verbalise their strategy. Unfortunately, the allocation of these children to 
the two conditions was less balanced than the group above (with more of them 
experiencing the Contrast modelling condition) but nonetheless a similar pattern 
emerged. Of the 13 children at this level in the Contrast modelling condition, 10 
improved (77%) whereas, of the 7 children at this level in the Non-Contingent condition, 
only 2 improved (35%). A Chi-square test of these frequencies found that there was a 
significant association between condition and improvement, X2  (1, N = 20) = 4.43, p  < 
.05. Thus, for children at the Abstraction Verbal level, it appears that improvement was 
more likely if they had been in the Contrast modelling although this analysis has to 
treated with caution as some expected frequencies were low. 
 
Therefore, it appears that children at the Implicit levels did not gain any particularly 
powerful assistance from Contrast modelling or Non-Contingent modelling.  In contrast, 
children with a centre theory of balancing, whether verbalisable or not, were helped more 
by the Contrast modelling condition than by the Non-Contingent modelling condition, a 
pattern which reflects the more general finding of the study.  
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Discussion
 
This study set out to investigate whether modelling the correct solution to a child on the 
balance beam task would be more effective when the modelling was contingent upon the 
child’s own error. This was done either by showing children the correct solution 
immediately after their own error (Contrast modelling), or by simply showing children 
correct solutions to their previous errors (Non-Contingent modelling). Our hypothesis, 
that the Contrast modelling condition would produce more children who improved than 
the Non-Contingent modelling condition, is supported by the data reported here. As well 
as significantly improving the children’s ability to balance asymmetrical beams, this 
condition was also effective in bringing about improvement in the children’s 
representations of balancing. There are also indications that Contrast modelling was 
especially effective with children at the Abstraction levels, i.e., those who were failing to 
balance asymmetrical beams due to overgeneralisation of a centre strategy. The choice of 
control groups followed the design employed in the research by Saxton (1997).  It should 
be acknowledged that the employment of additional control groups would further 
increase confidence in these conclusions, for example by having a group who attempted 
the task but did not receive any feedback, and by having a group who did not engage in 
the task at all.   
 
Although the Contrast theory of corrective input has been advanced as an explanation for 
improvement in children’s language (Saxton, 1997), this is the first attempt (as far as we 
are aware) to apply the theory to a different cognitive domain. In our study the 
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participants were not children who were making linguistic errors, but children who were 
balancing wooden beams on a fulcrum. It is therefore interesting to discover that a similar 
principle, which operates in language learning, can also help children in other domains.  
Given that it is difficult to assist the cognitive development of children who attempt to 
balance beams at their geometric centre (Messer et al., 1996; Pine & Messer, 1998, 
2000), it is especially interesting that these children made significant gains in the Contrast 
modelling condition.  
 
The question that our data does not answer is exactly why the contingency of the 
modelling appears to be so crucial to assisting cognitive development. We can only 
speculate as to why this may be the case. Saxton claims that contrast modelling is 
effective because it reveals to the child a contrast, or conflict, between their own error 
and the correct form. This, he says, provides a basis for rejecting the incorrect form. Can 
this explain why non-contingent modelling is less effective in the present study? Here, 
the children who made errors at pre-test went on to retry them in the Non-Contingent 
modelling condition and to see an adult modelling the correct solution just a minute or  
two later. In the Contrast modelling condition, the child had another attempt with each 
beam they had failed to balance and this was followed immediately by the adult 
modelling the correct solution. It may seem surprising to some that this subtle 
contingency manipulation was responsible for producing such a large effect. One might 
expect that children in the Non-Contingent modelling condition, having had the solution 
shown to them, would also go on to adopt a better strategy at post-test. Yet two-thirds of 
them failed to do so and continued to make errors. The difference in conditions, with one 
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having the child see the correct solution modelled after making the error, produced a 
dramatically different picture with almost two-thirds of the children from the Contrast 
Modelling condition performing better at post-test. 
  
In our work we have always found it informative to measure not only what children are 
able to do (e.g., how many beams they can balance) but also what children actually know 
and the different ways of knowing (see Pine & Messer, 2000). This is because children 
can sometimes balance all the beams with little or no ability to explain their own success. 
Or, alternatively, they can fail with asymmetrical beams and yet show signs of beginning 
to develop some abstract knowledge about balancing, which involves balancing the 
beams at their centre. Therefore, children’s balancing performance can be accompanied 
by knowledge at varying levels of explicitness (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) and this is 
borne out by the six levels of representation used to classify children in this study. We 
propose that the effects identified in this study can be best explained by supposing that 
children’s cognitive development is facilitated by their having to access their 
representations at the same time that information that challenges their representations is 
presented. Children at the Implicit level did not improve, and this may have been due to 
the fact that they cannot access their representations. During Contrast modelling, the 
child is presented with the correct solution whilst their own representation of the task is 
still active i.e., immediately after their own attempt. In the Non-Contingent modelling 
condition, the children saw the correct solution but their own representation may no 
longer have been active, with the result that it was less likely to be challenged. Support 
for this interpretation comes from other findings which indicate that when children at the 
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Abstraction level are asked to explain another’s correct non-contingent performance their 
own performance improves, whereas children who see the model but do not have to 
explain what is happening do not improve (Pine & Messer, 2000).  Thus, we hypothesise, 
that when the correct model is presented in a non-contingent manner and children are 
asked to access their own representations then cognitive progress is more likely to occur. 
Thus, we are not disagreeing with Saxton’s ideas about Contrast modelling, but 
suggesting that they may be extended to a greater range of circumstances. 
 
Assessing changes in the children's representations of the task, as well as their 
performance, also gives more insight into whether children are merely mimicking the 
correct solution they saw modelled or whether they have made cognitive progress in their 
understanding of the task. The representational improvement, as well as procedural 
change, found in many children this study is more likely to be indicative of lasting 
cognitive change (as found in Messer et al., 1996; Pine et al., 1999) although future 
studies could employ delayed post-tests to verify this. Saxton et al. (1998) has carried out 
a study into the longer-term effects of this type of corrective modelling and found that 
improvements in children's linguistic output were sustained five weeks later.    
 
In this study we selected children aged from 5 to 7 years, since children older than this 
are more likely to be able to balance all the beams. Saxton, too, concentrated on 5 year-
olds, an age when children are still making linguistic errors. It is therefore possible that 
this learning mechanism is only appropriate within a certain age group. However, 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has pointed out that representational levels are not restricted to 
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certain ages or stages and it is likely that older children or adult learners could also 
benefit from contrast modelling in other domains. Thus, whilst this work clearly raises 
many questions about the domain generality of language learning mechanisms, we 
believe further work in this area might illuminate the potential of this method for those 
involved in teaching or training. It suggests that, because of its non-contingency, 
demonstrating a new skill to others might not be the best approach for a teacher to adopt. 
These data suggest that allowing the learner to attempt the task first and then providing 
the correct model immediately after an error has occurred might be a more effective way 
of facilitating change. 
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Table 1: The number of children who were at each level at pre- and post-test, allocation 
to conditions and number who improved. 
 
REPRESENT
-ATIONAL 
LEVEL 
 
NUMBER OF 
CHILDREN AT LEVEL  
CONTRAST 
MODELLING 
NON-CONTINGENT 
MODELLING 
 Pre-test Post-test n n 
improved* 
n n 
improved* 
Pre-Implicit 
 
5 
 
3 3 2 2 
 
0 
Implicit 
 
9 9 3 0 6 0 
 
Implicit 
Transition 
14 9 6 4 8 3 
 
Abstraction 
Non-Verbal 
21 12 10 
 
7 11 3 
 
Abstraction 
Verbal 
20 16 13 10 7 2 
 
Explicit 
Transition 
9 19 3 0 6 1 
E3 
 
0 10 n/a n/a 
 79 38 23 40 9 
1 subject missing data 
* improvement defined as being at a higher level at post-test than pre-test. 
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Figure 1: Examples of (a) symmetrical beams and (b) asymmetrical beams used in the 
balance beam task. 
 
(a)        
 
 
 
 
(b)   
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Figure 2: The mean number of asymmetrical beams balanced at pre- and post-test by 
children in each of the conditions. 
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